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Abstract
   This specification defines a concept of alert discriminator which
   operates over Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD).
   New diagnostic codes, solely to be used together with alert
   discriminators, are also defined in this specification.
Requirements Language
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 05, 2014.
Copyright Notice
   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.
   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.
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1.  Introduction
   [RFC5880] defines the use of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
   protocol as a fast failure detection mechanism between nodes which
   are adjacent to each other or multiple hops away.  [RFC5881] defines
   single hop BFD.  Specifications such as [RFC5883] and [RFC5884]
   define multihop BFD.
   When multihop BFD, IP based or MPLS based, declares a failure,
   responsibility of identifying the problematic point in the paths is
   often left to operators.  ICMP echo request/reply (IP ping) [RFC0792]
   and LSP echo request/reply (LSP ping) [RFC4379] allow for tracing of
   hops to a specific target, and these are often used, manually or
   automatically, to attempt to isolate faults.  However, when it comes
   to identifying the problematic point that caused BFD failure, there
   are couple of issues.
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   o  Usage of non-BFD packets can result in them being load balanced
      differently along the paths, causing those packets to traverse
      different paths than BFD packets to the target.
   o  BFD is designed with simplicity and low-overhead as goals.  Thus
      implementations often provide more preferable scale/performance
      capacities over IP/LSP ping, allowing for increased probability to
      identify short-lived transient issues.
   Above points produced the desire to use BFD to trace hops to a
   specific target.
   This specification defines a generic concept of alert discriminator
   which operates over Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
   (S-BFD) [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-base].  New diagnostic codes, solely
   to be used together with alert discriminators, are also defined in
   this specification.  Finally, BFD path tracing is described as one of
   the use cases of defined mechanism.
   It is worth noting that this specification does not reserve specific
   BFD discriminator value as the alert discriminator, but only defines
   the concept of alert discriminators.
2.  Overview
   A group of network nodes reserves a same BFD discriminator value as
   the alert discriminator.  Alert discriminator operates as a BFD
   target identifier of alert type (3).  A reflector BFD session is then
   responsible for monitoring incoming BFD control packets with alert
   discriminator as "your discriminator".  Reflector BFD session, upon
   reception of BFD control packets with alert discriminator as "your
   discriminator", would examine BFD diagnostic code.  Diagnostic code
   instructs how reflector BFD session is to behave.  A network node is
   able to transmit S-BFD control packets with "your discriminator" as
   this alert discriminator and well known diagnostic code, to a
   particular target, and expect reflector BFD session on the target
   network node to behave accordingly.
3.  Alert Discriminator
   Alert discriminator is a BFD target identifier of type (3).
    Value    BFD Target Identifier Type
   ------    --------------------------
        3    Alert Discriminator
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   Uniqueness of alert discriminator is that same BFD discriminator
   value is reserved on group of network nodes as the alert
   discriminator.
   For example, there are 4 network nodes in a network: A, B, C, D.
   0x7F7F7F7F is chosen as the alert discriminator for this network.
   Nodes A, B, C and D will each reserve 0x7F7F7F7F as BFD target
   identifier type 3.
   How alert discriminator value is to be chosen is outside the scope of
   this document.
4.  Reflector BFD Session
   One or more reflector BFD session(s) MUST be created on each network
   node which has reserved alert discriminator(s).  Reflector BFD
   session MUST listen for incoming S-BFD control packets with "your
   discriminator" of BFD target identifier type 3, alert discriminators.
   Further procedures for a reflector BFD session processing incoming
   S-BFD control packets for BFD target identifier type 3 depends on
   specified BFD diagnostic code.  Definition of BFD diagnostic code for
   alert discriminator usage and required reflector BFD session behavior
   for each are described in Section 5.
5.  Alert Discriminator Diagnostic Code
   [RFC5880] defines a field to describe diagnostic code in a BFD
   control packet, and defines set of diagnostic codes.  This
   specification defines a new set of diagnostic codes to be used solely
   for S-BFD control packets using alert discriminators.  New diagnostic
   codes specified in this document are only meaningful when used
   together with alert discriminators.
   o  S-BFD control packets transmitted and received, destined for BFD
      target identifier of type 3, MUST NOT use diagnostic codes defined
      in [RFC5880] and MUST use diagnostic codes defined in this
      document.
   o  [S-]BFD control packets transmitted and received, not destined for
      BFD target identifier of type 3, MUST use diagnostic codes defined
      in [RFC5880] and MUST NOT use diagnostic codes defined in this
      document.
   Note that BFD diagnostic codes for alert discriminators are defined
   from highest possible values.  Any future documents claiming alert
   discriminator diagnostic codes MUST use next available highest values
   from the reserved range.  Alert discriminator diagnostic codes are
   defined as follow:
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    Value    Alert Discriminator Diagnostic Code Name
   ------    ----------------------------------------
     0-30    Reserved for future use
       31    BFD path trace
   When transmitted BFD control packet is targeted to a BFD target
   identifier of type 3, then BFD diagnostic code MUST NOT be zero.
   When receiving BFD control packet is targeted to a BFD target
   identifier of type 3, then packet with BFD diagnostic code of zero
   MUST be dropped.
   Note that primary purpose of alert discriminator diagnostic codes are
   to provide hints to responder on why initiator is sending alert
   discriminator S-BFD packets.
6.  BFD Path Trace: Alert Discriminator Diagnostic Code 31
   BFD path trace, aka BFD traceroute, is performed through making use
   of the alert discriminator with alert discriminator diagnostic code
   31.
6.1.  Initiator Procedures
   When a network node desires to trace hops to a BFD target, S-BFD
   control packets are transmitted with following contents.
6.1.1.  Transmission S-BFD Control Packets
   o  IP destination address or MPLS label stack MUST be set to describe
      the target.
   o  "your discriminator" MUST be set to an alert discriminator.
   o  BFD diagnostic code MUST be set to 31 (BFD path trace).
   o  Poll (P) bit MUST be set.
   o  Incrementing or decrementing IP/MPLS TTL.
   o  Remaining packet contents are as per described in
      [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-ip].
   When incrementing TTL is used towards the BFD target, TTL SHOULD
   start at value of 1.  Completion of BFD path trace is reached when
   locally determined so (ex: no response from one of the nodes) or when
   one of following conditions are hit, and initiator MUST NOT transmit
   BFD path trace packets to further downstream network nodes:
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   o  Response S-BFD control packet has been received from intended BFD
      target.
   o  In case IP address(es) of intended BFD target is unknown, two
      consecutive response S-BFD control packets (TTL+n and TTL+(n+1))
      contain same IP source address.
   When decrementing TTL is used, BFD path trace SHOULD start from the
   BFD target using TTL=N. How value of N is determined is outside the
   scope of this document.  Completion of BFD path trace is reached when
   locally determined so or after performing BFD path trace operation to
   TTL=1.
   Because there are no sequence numbers included in transmitted and
   received S-BFD control packets (without use of Authentication) for
   BFD path tracing, initiator SHOULD allow some delay between multiple
   BFD path tracing operations for a same target, if same "my
   discriminator" value is used on them.  This is to ensure responses
   from multiple BFD path tracing operations do not conflict with each
   other, resulting in incorrectly recorded hops.
6.1.2.  Reception of S-BFD Control Packets
   If response S-BFD control packets do not contain "my discriminator"
   of alert discriminator, then packet MUST NOT be considered as
   response for BFD path tracing.
   If response S-BFD control packets do not have Final (F) bit set, then
   packet MUST NOT be considered as response for BFD path tracing.
   If response S-BFD control packets do not contain BFD diagnostic code
   31, then packet MUST NOT be considered as response for BFD path
   tracing.
   IP source address of valid response S-BFD control packets are
   recorded to form trace hops to the BFD target.
6.2.  Responder Procedures
   Reflector BFD session at the responder network node MUST operate with
   procedures described in [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-ip].
6.2.1.  Reception of S-BFD Control Packets
   Following conditions MUST be met for received S-BFD control packets
   targeted to BFD target identifier of type 3 to be considered for BFD
   path tracing:
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   o  BFD diagnostic code is 31 (BFD path trace).
   o  Poll (P) bit is set.
6.2.2.  Transmission of S-BFD Control Packets
   Following procedures MUST be followed when transmitting a response
   S-BFD control packet for BFD path tracing:
   o  BFD diagnostic code in response S-BFD packet MUST be set to 31
      (BFD path trace).
   o  Final (F) bit MUST be set.
6.3.  Possible Use Cases
   BFD path tracing may be desirable for following occasions.
   o  When a BFD session is determined to have lost reachability to the
      target (ex: state transitions from UP to DOWN), immediately
      trigger BFD path trace to the target to attempt to isolate the
      fault.
   o  While a particular BFD session is in UP state, occasionally
      trigger BFD path trace in the background to record the paths.
      Compare recorded paths to see how frequently paths are changing.
      If determined to be more frequent than expected, then log a
      warning to indicate potential network instability.
   o  Just trigger BFD path trace, manually or automatically, as needed
      basis.
7.  Security Considerations
   Alert discriminator selected for a network should be kept from being
   disclosed to anybody or anything external to the network.  This will
   prevent attacks from knowing the exact value for the alert
   discriminator.  It is still possible for attacks to scan a range of
   BFD discriminator values to identify alert discriminator being used.
   Therefore, as described in [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-base],
   implementations MUST provide filtering capability based on source IP
   addresses.
   In addition, same security considerations as [RFC5880], [RFC5881],
   [RFC5883], [RFC5884], [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-base] and
   [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-ip] apply to this document.
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8.  IANA Considerations
   BFD Target Identifier types:
    Value    BFD Target Identifier Type
   ------    --------------------------
        3    Alert Discriminator
   Alert Discriminator Diagnostic Code:
    Value    Alert Discriminator Diagnostic Code Name
   ------    ----------------------------------------
     0-30    Reserved for future use
       31    BFD path trace
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1.  Introduction
   Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), [RFC5880] and related
   documents, has efficiently generalized the failure detection
   mechanism for multiple protocols and applications.  There are some
   improvements which can be made to better fit existing technologies.
   There is a possibility of evolving BFD to better fit new
   technologies.  This document focuses on several aspects of BFD in
   order to further improve efficiency, to expand failure detection
   coverage and to allow BFD usage for wider scenarios.
   o  There are scenarios when only one side of the BFD, not both, are
      interested in verifying connectivity between a pair of systems.
      One example is when a static route uses BFD to validate
      reachability to the nexthop IP router.  Another example is when a
      uni-directional tunnel uses BFD to validate reachability to the
      egress node.  In such scenarios, regular BFD requires sessions to
      be provisioned on target nodes (ex: static route nexthop node,
      egress of RSVP-TE unidirectional LSP) which adds minimal value, if
      any, to those egress nodes.
   o  BFD provides data delivery confidence when reachability validation
      is performed prior to traffic utilizing specific paths/LSPs.
      However this comes with a cost where traffic is prevented to use
      such paths/LSPs until BFD is able to validate the reachability,
      which could take seconds due to BFD session bring-up sequences
      [RFC5880], LSP ping bootstrapping [RFC5884], etc.  S-BFD addresses
      these problems by eliminating the three-way handshake mechanism
      during bootstrap of BFD sessions resulting in faster reachability
      validation of BFD provisioned paths/LSPs.  In addition, it is
      expected that some MPLS technologies will require traffic
      engineered LSPs to get created dynamically, driven by external
      applications (ex: SDN).  It would be desirable to perform BFD
      validation very quickly to allow applications to utilize
      dynamically created LSPs in timely manner.
   o  Existing BFD standards provide a good mechanism to verify end-to-
      end reachability.  They however, do not allow BFD to perform
      partial reachability validations: ingress to transit, transit to
      transit and transit to egress.
   o  [RFC5884] defines a mechanism to run BFD on existing MPLS
      technologies.  It is used to perform end-to-end LSP liveliness
      check for detecting MPLS data plane failures.  This mechanism,
      however, lacks the ability to validate traversal of the intended
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      LSP path.  Specifically it cannot detect failures where one of the
      nodes along the LSP incorrectly label switches the BFD packet, as
      long as it reaches the intended LSP egress node.  The likelihood
      of this issue being seen depends on deployed MPLS technologies.
      With MPLS technologies that use downstream label allocation scheme
      (ex: RSVP, LDP), the incoming label itself provides a level of
      check as a node will drop any packet containing non-self-
      advertised label as the top label or will get delivered to
      unintended egress node.  The issue is less likely to be seen for
      such MPLS technologies.  With MPLS technologies such as Segment
      Routing (SR), incoming label can often be a label allocated and
      advertised by a node that is multiple downstream hops away.  For
      such MPLS technologies, issue will be more likely to be seen.
      [RFC4379] can detect such broken LSPs, but it is often difficult
      to run this technology at the rate which BFD is capable of.
   o  A node may desire to establish multiple BFD sessions to a network
      target.  One such scenario is when different applications on a
      system require running BFD to the same remote target with
      different failure detection time requirements.  Another scenario
      is when there are multiple unnumbered logical interfaces between a
      pair of network nodes.  A third scenario can be envisaged where a
      node hosts multiple BFD sessions to the same remote target on
      different parts of the system (e.g. different CPUs) in order to
      provide local redundancy when using BFD to validate paths/LSPs.
      Such a setup may be used to provide resiliency against local
      faults that can otherwise impact BFD sessions used to monitor
      paths/LSPs.
   This specification provides solutions to above issues by defining a
   generic mechanism to use Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
   with large portions of negotiation aspects eliminated, that allows
   full and partial reachability validation.  For MPLS based BFD,
   extensions to the generic mechanism are defined for BFD to perform a
   level of label verifications.  Because the mechanism eliminates much
   of negotiation aspects of the BFD protocol, "Seamless BFD" has been
   chosen as the name for this mechanism.
2.  Seamless BFD Overview
   To operate Seamless BFD, set of network entities are first selected.
   Each network node hosting selected network entities then assigns a
   special BFD discriminator to each selected local network entity.
   These network nodes will also create a BFD session instance that
   listens for incoming BFD control packets with "your discriminator"
   having local special BFD discriminators.  Mappings between selected
   network entities and corresponding special BFD discriminators are
   known to other network nodes belonging in the same network.  The
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   mechanism of disseminating the special BFD discriminators is beyond
   the scope of this specification.  A network node in such network is
   then able to send a BFD control packet to a particular target with
   corresponding special BFD discriminator as "your discriminator".
   Target network node, upon reception of such BFD control packet, will
   transmit a response BFD control packet back to the sender.
   Example: IPv4 address 1.2.3.4 is selected as the Seamless BFD target.
   Node hosting IPv4 address 1.2.3.4 reserves the BFD discriminator
   0x01020304, and creates a BFD session instance in listening mode.
   Node X sends a BFD control packet with destination IP address
   1.2.3.4, source IP address X, "your discriminator"=0x01020304 and "my
   discriminator"=<locally assigned discriminator>.  Node hosting IPv4
   address 1.2.3.4 will receive this packet, swaps received "your
   discriminator"/"my discriminator" and generates a response BFD
   control packet destined to X.
3.  Terminology
   The reader is expected to be familiar with the BFD, IP, MPLS and SR
   terminology and protocol constructs.  This section describes several
   new terminology introduced by Seamless BFD.
   o  BFD Target Identifier: Network entity that is provisioned as a
      target of Seamless BFD.
   o  BFD Target Identifier Type: Type of network entity that is
      provisioned as a target of Seamless BFD.
   o  BFD Target Identifier Table: A table containing BFD target
      identifier type, BFD target identifier and corresponding BFD
      discriminator.
   o  Reflector BFD Session: A BFD session listening for incoming BFD
      control packets destined for local BFD target identifier(s).
4.  BFD Target Identifier Types
   Number of network entity types (ex: IP address, segment ID) can make
   use of this mechanism.  To differentiate between different network
   entity types, a value is assigned to each type.
   BFD Target Identifier types:
      Value    BFD Target Identifier Type
     ------    --------------------------
          0    Reserved
          1    IP (IPv4 Address and Router ID)
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          2    Segment Routing Node Segment ID
   Note that IP based BFD from [RFC5885] is supported by this
   specification, but non-IP based BFD is outside the scope of this
   document.
   Further identifier types to be defined as on need basis.
5.  Reserved BFD Discriminators
   All local network identifiers which are to participate in this
   mechanism are to have specific BFD discriminators assigned.  Assigned
   BFD discriminators are attached to corresponding identifiers until
   they are explicitly un-provisioned.  BFD discriminators used for this
   mechanism are considered reserved, and MUST NOT be reused for other
   BFD sessions.
   Some examples of network identifier to BFD discriminator mappings:
   o  BFD Target Identifier Type 1: IPv4 address 1.1.1.1 maps to BFD
      discriminator 0x01010101.
   o  BFD Target Identifier Type 2: Node segment ID 0x03E800FF maps to
      BFD discriminator 0x03E800FF.
6.  BFD Target Identifier Table
   Each network node is responsible for creating and maintaining a table
   that contains BFD discriminators, BFD target identifier types and BFD
   target identifiers.  Intention of this table is to allow local
   entities to perform following lookups:
   o  BFD discriminator to BFD target identifier type and BFD target
      identifier
   o  BFD target identifier type and BFD target identifier to BFD
      discriminator
   This table is to contain entries for all locally reserved BFD
   discriminators and corresponding information.  This table may need to
   contain entries from other network nodes, depending on the BFD target
   identifier type.
7.  Reflector BFD Session
   Each network node MUST create one or more reflector BFD sessions.
   This reflector BFD session is a session which transmits BFD control
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   packets in response to received valid locally destined BFD control
   packets.  Specifically, this reflector BFD session is to have
   following characteristics:
   o  MUST NOT transmit any BFD control packets based on local timer
      expiry.
   o  MUST transmit BFD control packet in response to a received valid
      locally destined BFD control packet.
   o  MUST be capable of sending only two states: UP and ADMINDOWN.
   One reflector BFD session MAY be responsible for handling received
   BFD control packets targeted to all local BFD target identifiers, or
   few reflector BFD sessions MAY each be responsible for subset of
   local BFD target identifiers.  This policy is a local matter, and is
   outside the scope of this document.
   Note that incoming BFD control packets destined to BFD target
   identifier types may be IPv4, IPv6 or MPLS based.  For those BFD
   target identifier types, implementations MAY either allow the same
   reflector BFD session to handle all incoming BFD control packets in
   address family agnostic fashion, or setup multiple reflector BFD
   sessions to handle incoming BFD control packets with different
   address families.  This policy is again a local matter, and is
   outside the scope of this document.
8.  Full Reachability Validations
8.1.  Initiator Behavior
   Any network node can attempt to perform a full reachability
   validation to any BFD target identifier on other network nodes, as
   long as destination BFD target identifier is provisioned to use this
   mechanism.  BFD control packets transmitted by the initiator is to
   have "your discriminator" corresponding to destination BFD target
   identifier.
   A node that initiates a BFD control packet MAY create an active BFD
   session to periodically send BFD control packets to a target, or a
   BFD control packet MAY be crafted and sent out on "as needed basis"
   (ex: BFD ping) without any session presence.  In both cases, a BFD
   instance MUST have unique "my discriminator" value assigned.  If a
   node is to create multiple BFD instances to a same BFD target
   identifier, then each instance MUST have separate "my discriminator"
   values assigned.  A BFD instance MUST NOT use a discriminator
   corresponding to one of local BFD target identifiers as "my
   discriminator".  This is to prevent incoming response BFD control
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   packets ("pong" packets) having "your discriminator" as a
   discriminator correspondingto the local BFD target identifier.
   Below ASCII art describes high level concept of full reachability
   validations using this mechanism.  R2 reserves value XX as BFD
   discriminator for its BFD target identifier.  ASCII art shows that R1
   and R4 performing full reachability validation to XX on R2.
    -- md=50/yd=XX (BFD ping) -->
   <-- md=XX/yd=50 (BFD pong) --
                             [*]
    R1 ---------------------- R2 ----------- R3 ----------- R4
                             |  ^
                             |  |
                             |  + - md=60/yd=XX (BFD ping) --
                             + - - -md=XX/yd=60 (BFD pong) -->
   [*] Reflector BFD session on R2.
   If BFD control packet is to be sent via IP path, then:
   o  Destination IP address MUST be an IP address corresponding to
      target identifier.
   o  Source IP address MUST be a local IP address.
   o  IP TTL MUST be 255 for full reachability validations.  Partial
      reachability validations MAY use smaller TTL value (see
      Section 9).
   o  Well-known UDP destination port(s) for IP based S-BFD.
   If BFD control packet is to be sent via explicit label switching,
   then:
   o  BFD control packet MUST get imposed with a label stack that is
      expected to reach the target node.
   o  MPLS TTL MUST be 255 for full reachability validations.  Partial
      reachability validations MAY use smaller TTL value (see
      Section 9).
   o  Destination IP address MUST be 127/8 for IPv4 and
      0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:7F00/104 for IPv6.
   o  Source IP address MUST be a local IP address.
   o  IP TTL=1.
   o  Well-known UDP destination port(s) for MPLS based S-BFD
8.1.1.  Initiator State machine
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   The following diagram provides an overview of the initiator state
   machine.  The notation on each arc represents the state of the remote
   system (as received in the State field in the BFD Control packet) or
   indicates the expiration of the Detection Timer.
                    +--+
       ADMIN DOWN,  |  |
       TIMER        |  V
                  +------+   UP                +------+
                  |      |-------------------->|      |----+
                  | DOWN |                     |  UP  |    | UP
                  |      |<--------------------|      |<---+
                  +------+   ADMIN DOWN,       +------+
                             TIMER
   Note that the above state machine is different from the base BFD
   specification[RFC5880].  This is because the Init state is no longer
   applicable for the initiator of the S-BFD session.  Another important
   difference is the transition of the state machine from the Down state
   to the Up state when a packet with State Up is received by the
   initiator.  The definitions of the states and the events have the
   same meaning as in the base BFD specification [RFC5880].
8.2.  Responder Behavior
   A network node which receives BFD control packets transmitted by an
   initiator is referred as responder.  Responder, upon reception of BFD
   control packets, is to perform necessary relevant validations
   described in [RFC5880]/[RFC5881]/[RFC5883]/[RFC5884]/[RFC5885].
8.2.1.  Responder Demultiplexing
   When responder receives a BFD control packet, if "your discriminator"
   value is not one of local entries in the BFD target identifier table,
   then this packet MUST NOT be considered for this mechanism.  If "your
   discriminator" value is one of local entries in the BFD target
   identifier table, then the packet is determined to be handled by a
   reflector BFD session responsible for specified BFD targeted
   identifier.  If the packet was determined to be processed further for
   this mechanism, then chosen reflector BFD session is to transmit a
   response BFD control packet using procedures described in
   Section 8.2.2, unless prohibited by local administrative or local
   policy reasons.
8.2.2.  Reflector BFD Session Procedures
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   BFD target identifier type MUST be used to determine further
   information on how to reach back to the initiator.
   In addition, destination IP address of received BFD control packet
   MUST be examined to determine how to construct response BFD control
   packet to send back to the initiator.
   If destination IP address of received BFD control packet is not 127/8
   for IPv4 or 0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:7F00/104 for IPv6, then:
   o  Destination IP address MUST be copied from received source IP
      address.
   o  Source IP address MUST be copied from received destination IP
      address if received destination IP address is a local address.
      Otherwise local IP address MUST be used.
   o  IP TTL MUST be 255.
   If destination IP address of received BFD control packet is 127/8 for
   IPv4 or 0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:7F00/104 for IPv6, then received IP
   destination MUST be further examined to determine response transport
   options.  If last 23 bits of 127/8 for IPv4 and 0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:7F00/
   104 for IPv6 is zero, then response SHOULD be label switched but MAY
   be IP routed.  If last 23 bits of 127/8 for IPv4 and
   0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:7F00/104 for IPv6 is not zero, then response SHOULD be
   label switched and SHOULD NOT be IP routed.  Description of 23 bits
   is described in Section 10.
   If BFD control packet response is determined to be IP routed, then:
   o  Destination IP address MUST be copied from received source IP
      address.
   o  Source IP address MUST be a local address.
   o  IP TTL MUST be 255.
   If BFD control packet response is determined to be label switched,
   then:
   o  BFD control packet MUST get label switched back to the initiator.
      Determining the label stack to be imposed on a response BFD
      control packet is outside the scope of this document.
   o  MPLS TTL MUST be 255.
   o  Destination IP address MUST be 127/8 for IPv4 and
      0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:7F00/104 for IPv6.
   o  Source IP address MUST be a local IP address.
   o  IP TTL MUST be 1.
   Regardless of the response type, BFD control packet being sent by the
   responder MUST perform following procedures:
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   o  Copy "my discriminator" from received "your discriminator", and
      "your discriminator" from received "my discriminator".
   o  UDP destination port MUST be same as received UDP destination
      port.
   In addition, reflector BFD session SHOULD transmit response BFD
   control packet on the same interface on which it received the packet
   from initiator.
8.3.  Further Packet Details
   Further details of BFD control packets sent by initiator (ex: active
   BFD session):
   o  Well-known UDP destination port assigned for S-BFD.
   o  UDP source port as per described in [RFC5881]/[RFC5883]/[RFC5884]/
      [RFC5885].
   o  "my discriminator" assigned by local node.
   o  "your discriminator" corresponding to an identifier of target
      node.
   o  "State" MUST be set to a value reflecting local state.
   o  "Desired Min TX Interval" MUST be set to a value reflecting local
      desired minimum transmit interval.
   o  "Required Min RX Interval" MUST be zero.
   o  "Required Min Echo RX Interval" SHOULD be zero.
   o  "Detection Multiplier" MUST be set to a value reflecting locally
      used multiplier value.
   Further details of BFD control packets sent by responder (reflector
   BFD session):
   o  Well-known UDP destination port assigned for S-BFD.
   o  UDP source port as described in [RFC5881]/[RFC5883]/[RFC5884]/
      [RFC5885].
   o  "my discriminator" MUST be copied from received "your
      discriminator".
   o  "your discriminator" MUST be copied from received "my
      discriminator".
   o  "State" MUST be UP or ADMINDOWN.  Clarification of reflector BFD
      session state is described in Section 8.8.
   o  "Desired Min TX Interval" MUST be copied from received "Desired
      Min TX Interval".
   o  "Required Min RX Interval" MUST be set to a value reflecting how
      many incoming control packets this reflector BFD session can
      handle.
   o  "Required Min Echo RX Interval" SHOULD be set to zero.
   o  "Detection Multiplier" MUST be copied from received "Detection
      Multiplier".
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8.4.  Diagnostic Values
   Diagnostic value in both directions MAY be set to a certain value, to
   attempt to communicate further information to both ends.  However,
   details of such are outside the scope of this specification.
8.5.  The Poll Sequence
   The Poll sequence MUST operate in accordance with [RFC5880].
8.6.  Control Plane Independent (C)
   Control plane independent (C) bit for BFD instances speaking to a
   reflector BFD session MUST work according to [RFC5880].  Reflector
   BFD session also MUST work according to [RFC5880].  Specifically, if
   reflector BFD session implementation does not share fate with control
   plane, then response BFD control packets transmitted MUST have
   control plane independent (C) bit set.  If reflector BFD session
   implementation shares fate with control plane, then response BFD
   control packets transmitted MUST NOT have control plane independent
   (C) bit set.
8.7.  Additional Initiator Behavior
   o  If initiator receives valid BFD control packet in response to
      transmitted BFD control packet, then initiator SHOULD conclude
      that packet reached intended target.
   o  When a sufficient number of BFD control packets have not arrived
      as they should, the initiator could declare loss of reachability.
      The criteria for declaring loss of reachability and the action
      that would be triggered as a result are outside the scope of this
      specification.
   o  Relating to above bullet item, it is critical for an
      implementation to understand the latency to/from reflector BFD
      session on target node.  In other words, for very first BFD
      control packet transmitted, an implementation MUST NOT expect
      response BFD control packet to be received for time equivalent to
      sum of latencies: initiator node to target node and target node
      back to initiator node.
8.8.  Additional Responder Behavior
   o  BFD control packets transmitted by a reflector BFD session MUST
      have "Required Min RX Interval" set to a value which reflects how
      many incoming control packets this reflector BFD session can
      handle.  Responder can control how fast initiators will be sending
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      BFD control packets to self by ensuring "Required Min RX Interval"
      reflects a value based on current load.
   o  If a reflector BFD session wishes to communicate to some or all
      initiators that monitored BFD target identifier is "temporarily
      out of service", then BFD control packets with "state" set to
      ADMINDOWN are sent to those initiators.  Initiators, upon
      reception of such packets, MUST NOT conclude loss of reachability
      to corresponding BFD target identifier, and MUST back off packet
      transmission interval to corresponding BFD target identifier an
      interval no faster than 1 second.  If a reflector BFD session is
      generating a response BFD control packet for BFD target identifier
      that is in service, then "state" in response BFD control packets
      MUST be set to UP.
9.  Partial Reachability Validations
   Same mechanism as described in "Full Reachability Validations"
   section will be applied with exception of following differences on
   initiator.
   o  When initiator wishes to perform a partial reachability validation
      towards identifier X upto identifier Y, number of hops to
      identifier Y is calculated.
   o  TTL value based on this calculation is used as the IP TTL or MPLS
      TTL on top most label, and "your discriminator" of transmitted BFD
      control packet will carry BFD discriminator corresponding to
      target transit identifier Y.
   o  Imposed label stack or IP destination address will continue to be
      of identifier X.
10.  MPLS Label Verifications
   This section is only applicable to MPLS based sessions using this
   mechanism.
10.1.  MPLS Label Verifications Mechanism
   With full and partial reachability validations, initiator has the
   ability to determine if target identifier received the packet on any
   interfaces.  This section describes additional mechanism for
   initiator to determine if target identifier received the packet on a
   specific interface.
   So far for MPLS based sessions, this mechanism makes use of
   destination IP address of 127/8 range for IPv4 and of
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   0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:7F00/104 range for IPv6, in both directions.  In this
   section, 127/8 will be used to describe the MPLS label verification
   mechanism.  However, same concept is to be applied to IPv6 range
   0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:7F00/104.
   When a network node wishes to perform MPLS label verification, BFD
   control packet will have lower 23 bits of 127/8 destination IP
   address embedded with non-zero value.  One such non-zero value MAY be
   (label value + EXP) that is used to reach intended target identifier.
   Receiver of this BFD control packet, if last 23 bits of 127/8 address
   is not zero, then will embed information reflecting how the packet
   was received in the lower 23 bits of 127/8 destination IP address in
   the response BFD control packet.  If responder received the BFD
   control packet on a non-point-to-point interface, source MAC address
   MAY need to be examined to determine the "RX info" to embed in the
   returning packet.
     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |      0x7F     |R|     Zero or (label + EXP) or RX info        |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   9th bit is reserved for the time being and SHOULD be set to zero and
   SHOULD be ignored on receipt, by both initiator and responder
   Initiator receiving back a response will know that packet did reach
   intended identifier.  Initiator can also look into lower 23 bits of
   IP destination address in received BFD control packet to determine if
   packet sent was received by intended identifier in expected way (ex:
   expected RX interface).
   When (label + EXP) is being encoded, label is specified in higher 20
   bits of 23 bits and EXP is specified in lower 3 bits of 23 bits.
   If a response BFD control packet is received, then initiator can
   conclude that a packet has reached intended node correctly.  With
   information embedded in last 23 bits of response BFD control packet
   from responder, initiator has the ability to perform further
   verifications on how responded node received BFD control packet.
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10.2.  Localhost Address Usage
   Last 23 bits of 127/8 for IPv4 and 0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:7F00/104 for IPv6
   being non-zero is the trigger for responder to embed RX information
   in the response.  When initiator is performing only reachability
   validations to target identifiers, then last 23 bits of the localhost
   address SHOULD be zero.  This is to ensure unnecessary processing at
   responder is eliminated.  However, last 23 bits of the localhost
   address MAY be set to a non-zero value to traverse specific ECMP path
   if required.  Obvious side effect is the additional processing at
   responder to populate the RX info in response packet.
11.  Scaling Aspect
   This mechanism brings forth one noticeable difference in terms of
   scaling aspect: number of BFD sessions.  This specification
   eliminates the need for egress nodes to have fully active BFD
   sessions when only one side desires to perform reachability
   validations.  With introduction of reflector BFD concept, egress no
   longer is required to create any active BFD session per path/LSP
   basis.  Due to this, total number of BFD sessions in a network is
   reduced.
   If traditional BFD technology was used on a network comprised of N
   nodes, and each node monitored M unidirectional paths/LSPs, then
   total number of BFD sessions in such network will be:
   (((N - 1) x M) x 2)
   Assuming that each network node creates one reflector BFD session to
   handle all local BFD target identifiers, then total number of BFD
   sessions in same scenario will be:
   (((N - 1) x M) + N)
12.  Co-existence with Traditional BFD
   This mechanism has no issues being deployed with traditional BFDs
   ([RFC5881]/[RFC5883]/[RFC5884]/[RFC5885]) because BFD discriminators
   which allow this mechanism to function are explicitly reserved and
   separate UDP port values are used with S-BFD.
13.  BFD Echo
   BFD echo is outside the scope of this document.
14.  Summary
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   Conceptually, Seamless BFD is as a way to perform BFD Echo Mode using
   BFD control packets.  Critical differentiator being that target (ex:
   egress) is still required to respond.  This allows greater control of
   a session to the initiator while required target (ex: egress)
   response allows for proper validations.
   This section visits each aspect specified in the Introduction
   (Section 1) and describes how Seamless BFD provides beneficial
   impacts.
   o  Two sided BFD a MUST?
         Active BFD session instances are only created on network nodes
         that desire to validate/monitor reachability to specific
         targets through specific transports.  It is pre-created
         reflector BFD sessions which operate Seamless BFD functionality
         at egress in all cases.  Thus, it is no longer required for
         egress to create BFD sessions specific for paths/LSPs which are
         terminating on own network node.  Therefore, Seamless BFD is a
         nice fit for scenarios where only one side is wanting to
         perform the BFD check.
   o  Faster BFD bring-up?
         Reflector BFD sessions are persistent entities provisioned in
         the network ahead of time, on relevant network nodes.  When a
         network node desires to perform a reachability validation to a
         particular target, which already has a reflector BFD session
         monitoring the BFD target identifier, then generating the a
         Seamless BFD control packet and receiving back a Seamless BFD
         control packet is all that is required.  It is no longer
         required for egress to create a specific BFD session instance
         nor for BFD sessions to go through FSM based on sedated bring-
         up intervals.  Thus reachability validation is virtually
         instantaneous.
   o  Why end-to-end only?
         Seamless BFD creates separation of transport and intended
         receiver of the packet.  IP destination address or MPLS label
         stack of BFD control packets describes particular paths while
         "your discriminator" describes intended receiver of such
         packets.  Thus it is possible to inject BFD control packets
         from a transit node of a LSP.  It is also possible, with
         careful TTL manipulations, for a network node to test
         reachability of a path/LSP to a particular transit node.
   o  Is it taking the right path?
Akiya, et al.            Expires April 21, 2014                [Page 16]Internet-Draft              Seamless BFD Base               October 2013
         MPLS label verification aspect of Seamless BFD allows for
         testing of label programming.  If certain MPLS label stack with
         certain "your discriminator" results in a response packet to be
         received back, then a node can conclude that the packet reached
         intended receiver based on imposed MPLS label stack.  Also by
         examining "RX info" of received back BFD control packet, a node
         can determine if intended receiver received the packet in
         expected way (ex: on expected incoming interface).
   o  Is one really enough?
         With Seamless BFD, a network node is free to create any number
         of BFD session instances to a target, even if encapsulations of
         all such sessions are exactly the same.  Because each BFD
         session instance will have a unique "my discriminator",
         response BFD control packets can get demultiplexed correctly
         into right session.
15.  Security Considerations
   Same security considerations as [RFC5880], [RFC5881], [RFC5883],
   [RFC5884] and [RFC5885] apply to this document.
   Additionally, implementing following measures will strengthen
   security aspects of this mechanism described by this document.
   o  Implementations MUST provide filtering capability based on source
      IP addresses or source node segment IDs of received BFD control
      packets: [RFC2827].
   o  Implementations MUST NOT act on received BFD control packets
      containing Martian addresses as source IP addresses.
   o  Implementations MUST ensure response target IP addresses or node
      segment IDs are reachable.
16.  IANA Considerations
   BFD Target Identifier types:
      Value    BFD Target Identifier Type
     ------    --------------------------
          0    Reserved
          1    IP (IPv4 Address and Router ID)
          2    Segment Routing Node Segment ID
   New UDP port number(s) will be requested for S-BFD.
Akiya, et al.            Expires April 21, 2014                [Page 17]Internet-Draft              Seamless BFD Base               October 2013
17.  Acknowledgements
   Authors would like to thank Girija Raghavendra Rao, Marc
   Binderberger, Srihari Raghavan, Vanitha Neelamegam and Vengada Prasad
   Govindan from Cisco Systems for providing valuable comments.
18.  Contributing Authors
   Tarek Saad
   Cisco Systems
   Email: tsaad@cisco.com
   Siva Sivabalan
   Cisco Systems
   Email: msiva@cisco.com
   Nagendra Kumar
   Cisco Systems
   Email: naikumar@cisco.com
   Mallik Mudigonda
   Cisco Systems
   Email: mmudigon@cisco.com
19.  References
19.1.  Normative References
   [I-D.previdi-filsfils-isis-segment-routing]
              Previdi, S., Filsfils, C., Bashandy, A., Horneffer, M.,
              Decraene, B., Litkowski, S., Milojevic, I., Shakir, R.,
              Ytti, S., Henderickx, W., and J. Tantsura, "Segment
              Routing with IS-IS Routing Protocol", draft-previdi-
              filsfils-isis-segment-routing-02 (work in progress), March
              2013.
   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
   [RFC5880]  Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
              (BFD)", RFC 5880, June 2010.
   [RFC5881]  Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
              (BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)", RFC 5881, June
              2010.
   [RFC5883]  Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
              (BFD) for Multihop Paths", RFC 5883, June 2010.
Akiya, et al.            Expires April 21, 2014                [Page 18]Internet-Draft              Seamless BFD Base               October 2013
   [RFC5884]  Aggarwal, R., Kompella, K., Nadeau, T., and G. Swallow,
              "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for MPLS Label
              Switched Paths (LSPs)", RFC 5884, June 2010.
19.2.  Informative References
   [I-D.ietf-bfd-on-lags]
              Bhatia, M., Chen, M., Boutros, S., Binderberger, M., and
              J. Haas, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) on Link
              Aggregation Group (LAG) Interfaces", draft-ietf-bfd-on-
              lags-01 (work in progress), June 2013.
   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
   [RFC4379]  Kompella, K. and G. Swallow, "Detecting Multi-Protocol
              Label Switched (MPLS) Data Plane Failures", RFC 4379,
              February 2006.
   [RFC5885]  Nadeau, T. and C. Pignataro, "Bidirectional Forwarding
              Detection (BFD) for the Pseudowire Virtual Circuit
              Connectivity Verification (VCCV)", RFC 5885, June 2010.
   [RFC6428]  Allan, D., Swallow Ed. , G., and J. Drake Ed. , "Proactive
              Connectivity Verification, Continuity Check, and Remote
              Defect Indication for the MPLS Transport Profile", RFC
              6428, November 2011.
Authors’ Addresses
   Nobo Akiya
   Cisco Systems
   Email: nobo@cisco.com
   Carlos Pignataro
   Cisco Systems
   Email: cpignata@cisco.com
   Dave Ward
   Cisco Systems
   Email: wardd@cisco.com
Akiya, et al.            Expires April 21, 2014                [Page 19]Internet-Draft              Seamless BFD Base               October 2013
   Manav Bhatia
   Alcatel-Lucent
   Email: manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com
   Santosh
   Juniper Networks
   Email: santoshpk@juniper.net
Akiya, et al.            Expires April 21, 2014                [Page 20]Internet Engineering Task Force                                 N. Akiya
Internet-Draft                                              C. Pignataro
Intended status: Standards Track                                 D. Ward
Expires: December 09, 2013                                 Cisco Systems
                                                           June 07, 2013
        Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for IP
                     draft-akiya-bfd-seamless-ip-00
Abstract
   This specification defines procedures to use Seamless Bidirectional
   Forwarding Detection (BFD) in IP and IP signalled MPLS environments.
Requirements Language
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 09, 2013.
Copyright Notice
   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.
   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
Akiya, et al.           Expires December 09, 2013               [Page 1]Internet-Draft             Seamless BFD for IP                 June 2013
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  BFD Target Identifier Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Reserved BFD Discriminators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  BFD Target Identifier Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Full Reachability Validations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     5.1.  Initiator Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     5.2.  Responder Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Partial Reachability Validations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  MPLS Label Verifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   8.  Provisiong Active IP Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   11. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   12. Contributing Authors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors’ Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
1.  Introduction
   One application for Seamless Bidrectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
   [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-base] is to perform full and partial
   reachability validations on IP and IP signalled MPLS environments.
   This specification defines procedures to use Seamless BFD in IP and
   IP signalled MPLS environments.
2.  BFD Target Identifier Type
   BFD target identifier type of value 1 is used for IPv4 addresses and
   router IDs.  This identifier type will cover Seamless BFD in
   following scenarios:
   o  BFD control packets IPv4 routed.
   o  BFD control packets IPv6 routed.
   o  BFD control packets label switched in IPv4 signaled LSP.
   o  BFD control packets label switched in IPv6 signaled LSP.
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   Not all IPv6 aspects are covered by this specification, and details
   are clarified in Section 3.
3.  Reserved BFD Discriminators
   With IPv4 based BFD, BFD target identifier type 1 is used.  BFD
   discriminator values corresponding to all or subset of local IPv4
   addresses are to be reserved.  IPv4 addresses are used as BFD
   discriminators.  Corresponding BFD discriminators MUST be reserved
   and those BFD discriminators MUST NOT be used for other BFD sessions.
   Example:
   o  BFD Target Identifier Type 1: IPv4 address 3.3.2.1 maps to BFD
      discriminator 0x03030201.
   With IPv6 based BFD, BFD target identifier type 1 is used.  BFD
   discriminator values corresponding to all or subset of local IGP
   Router IDs are to be reserved.  These router IDs are used as BFD
   discriminators.  With OSPFv3, employed 32 bit router IDs are used.
   Corresponding BFD discriminators MUST be reserved and those BFD
   discriminators MUST NOT be used for other BFD sessions.  ISIS is not
   included as part of this identifier type, and is outside the scope of
   this document.
   Example:
   o  BFD Target Identifier Type 1: Router-ID 3.3.4.5 maps to BFD
      discriminator 0x03030405.
   Note that it is acceptable for an IPv4 address and a router-ID to
   collide, mapping into a same BFD discriminator value.  There will not
   be an issue as long as colliding BFD discriminator value is reserved
   for the Seamless BFD purpose.
4.  BFD Target Identifier Table
   With IP identifier type, only locally reserved BFD discriminators and
   corresponding information are to be in this table.  No inter-node
   communications are needed to exchange BFD discriminator and BFD
   target identifier mappings.
5.  Full Reachability Validations
5.1.  Initiator Behavior
   Any IP network node can attempt to perform a full reachability
   validation to any BFD target identifier of type 1 (IPv4 address or
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   router-ID) on other network nodes, as long as destination BFD target
   identifier is provisioned to use this mechanism.  Transmitted BFD
   control packet by the initiator is to have "your discriminator"
   corresponding to destination BFD target identifier of type 1.
   Initiator is to use following procedures to construct BFD control
   packets to perform IP full reachability validations on BFD packets
   that are IP routed:
   o  MUST set "your discriminator" to target IPv4 address or target
      router-ID.
   o  If packet is to be explicitly label switched, then explicit label
      switching packet format described in [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-base]
      MUST be used.  Otherwise IP routing packet format described in
      [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-base] MUST be used.
5.2.  Responder Behavior
   To respond to received BFD control packet which was targeted to local
   BFD target identifier of type 1 (IP ddress or router-ID), response
   BFD control packet is targeted to IP address taken from received
   "source IP address".  Responder MUST validate obtained IP address is
   in valid format (ex: not Martian address).  Responder MUST consult
   local routing table to ensure obtained IP address is reachable.
6.  Partial Reachability Validations
   Procedures described in [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-base] applies.
7.  MPLS Label Verifications
   MPLS label verification mechanism is applicable to those IP based BFD
   which use explicit label switching techniques.  However, details of
   what responder embeds in the lower 23 bits of localhost address, and
   how initiator determines correctness of label programming is outside
   the scope of this document.
8.  Provisiong Active IP Sessions
   Active IP BFD sessions, single-hop, multi-hop or MPLS can be
   instantiated on any network node using this mechanism to any IPv4
   target addresses and OSPFv3 router IDs using this mechanism.  This
   style of usage is particularly useful only if one side is required to
   perform full reachability validations (ex: static route, uni-
   directional tunnel).  This style of usage is also particularly useful
   to perform validations and verifications on just subset of LSPs (ex:
   inter-AS, injection of partial BFD reachability validation packet on
   IPv4 RSVP LSP nodes).
Akiya, et al.           Expires December 09, 2013               [Page 4]Internet-Draft             Seamless BFD for IP                 June 2013
9.  Security Considerations
   Same security considerations as [RFC5880], [RFC5881], [RFC5883],
   [RFC5884], [RFC5885] and [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-base] apply to this
   document.
10.  IANA Considerations
   None
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1.  Introduction
   One application for Seamless Bidrectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
   [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-base] is to perform full reachability
   validations, partial reachability validations and adjacency segment
   ID verifications on a Segment Routing (SR) based environment.
   This specification defines procedures to use Seamless BFD in a SR
   based environment.
2.  BFD Target Identifier Types
   BFD target identifier type of value 2 is used for SR.  Note that BFD
   target identifier type of value 2, which specifies segment routing
   node segment ID, is not tied to a specific routing protocol.  If
   definitions and procedures need routing protocol specifics, then IGP
   specific SR types will be defined.
3.  Reserved BFD Discriminators
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   With SR technology, BFD target identifier type 2 is used.  BFD
   discriminator values corresponding to all or subset of local node
   segment IDs are to be reserved on corresponding network node.  Node
   segment IDs are used as BFD discriminators.  Corresponding BFD
   discriminators MUST be reserved and those BFD discriminators MUST NOT
   be used for other BFD sessions.
   Example:
   o  BFD Target Identifier Type 2: Node segment ID 0x03E9A0FF maps to
      BFD discriminator 0x03E9A0FF.
4.  BFD Target Identifier Table
   With SR BFD target identifier type, only locally reserved BFD
   discriminators and corresponding information are to be in this table.
   No inter-node communications are needed to exchange BFD discriminator
   and BFD target identifier mappings.
5.  Full Reachability Validations
5.1.  Initiator Behavior
   Any SR network node can attempt to perform a full reachability
   validation to any BFD target identifier of type 2 (node segment ID)
   on other network nodes, as long as destination BFD target identifier
   is provisioned to use this mechanism.  Transmitted BFD control packet
   by the initiator is to have "your discriminator" corresponding to
   destination BFD target identifier of type 2.
   Initiator is to use following procedures to construct BFD control
   packets to perform SR full reachability validations:
   o  MUST set "your discriminator" to target node segment ID.
   o  MUST use explicit label switching packet format described in [I-D
      .akiya-bfd-seamless-base].
5.2.  Responder Behavior
   To respond to received BFD control packet which was targeted to local
   BFD target identifier of type 2 (Segment Routing Node Segment ID),
   response BFD control packet is targeted to IP address taken from
   received "source IP address".  Responder MUST validate obtained IP
   address is in valid format (ex: not Martian address).  Responder MUST
   consult local routing table to ensure obtained IP address is
   reachable.  Responder MAY impose node segment ID, corresponding to
   obtained IP address, on the response BFD control packet.
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6.  Partial Reachability Validations
   Procedures described in [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-base] applies.
7.  MPLS Label Verifications
   With target identifier type 2, SR based, when a network node wants to
   test an adjacency segment ID, then adjacency segment ID (label value
   + EXP) being tested is encoded as lower 23 bits of localhost IP
   destination address.  When passive BFD session receives a SR BFD
   control packet with lower 23 bits of IP destination address non-zero,
   then response will contain adjacency segment ID (label value + EXP)
   corresponding to incoming interface as lower 23 bits of localhost IP
   destination address.
   Simple ASCII art is provided to illustrate the MPLS label
   verification concept on a SR network.
               md=50/yd=R3/DIP=127...R2R3
   Active  [1] - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - >  Passive
   BFD     < - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [2]   BFD
   Session     md=R3/yd=50/DIP=127...R3R2      Session
                               (adj SID R2R3)->
     R1 ------------------ R2 ------------------ R3
                               <-(adj SID R3R2)
   If a response BFD control packet is received, then initiator can
   conclude that a packet has reached intended node correctly.  With
   information embedded in last 23 bits of response BFD control packet
   from responder, initiator has the ability to perform further
   verifications on how responded node received BFD control packet.
8.  Provisioning Active BFD Sessions for SR Networks
   Many factors will influence how to provision active BFD sessions on
   which network nodes.  This section provides some provisioning
   suggestions of active BFD sessions on SR networks.  However, they are
   only suggestions.  Less provisioning of active BFD sessions may be
   required in some cases, or further active BFD sessions may be
   required in other cases.
   Traffic engineered segment routing
   o  SR TE LSP has path-protection and no local repairs on transit
      nodes: Active BFD sessions should be instantiated on the LSP
      ingress.  Instantiated active BFD sessions should perform full
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      reachability validation to all node segment IDs that are immediate
      nexthop of all adjacency segment IDs used in the LSP.  This
      verifies that strict switching based on adjacency segment IDs is
      being switched to correct downstream node segment.  If multiple
      links exist on one or more of adjacency points being validated,
      MPLS label verification technique should also be provisioned to
      ensure correct link is being traversed.  Lastly, full reachability
      validation should be performed from LSP ingress to LSP egress to
      verify end-to-end reachability.  Fate of the LSP is tied to all
      active BFD sessions instantiated on LSP ingress.
   o  SR TE LSP has local repairs on transit nodes: Active BFD sessions
      should be instantiated on each local repair points, using
      combination of full reachability validation technique and MPLS
      label verification technique.  These active sessions are
      programmed to be one of the triggers of local repair procedures.
      Lastly, full reachability validation should be performed from LSP
      ingress to LSP egress to verify end-to-end reachability, but this
      should be provisioned with more relaxed failure detection count
      than other active BFD sessions instantiated on transit repair
      points.  Fate of the LSP is tied only to the active BFD session
      verifying end-to-end reachability on LSP ingress.
   Single node segment ID data forwarding
   o  In order to protect all data passing through local network using
      single node segment ID, active BFD sessions can be instantiated on
      each network edge node to verify full reachability to all other
      network edge nodes.
   o  Additionally, it may be beneficial to provision active BFD
      sessions on other network nodes (non-edge) for local repair
      purposes.  These network nodes can also instantiate active BFD
      sessions to desired identifier (edge or non-edge).
9.  Security Considerations
   Same security considerations as [RFC5880], [RFC5881], [RFC5883],
   [RFC5884], [RFC5885] and [I-D.akiya-bfd-seamless-base] apply to this
   document.
10.  IANA Considerations
   None
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